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Abstract— Wireless networks, despite providing better 
access and flexibility, have vulnerabilities that are easier to 
realize compared to wired networks. Fake authentication 
attack can be taken by an attacker prior to carrying out a Man 
in the Middle attack to intercept the other party's 
communication. Such an attack is generally carried out in 
public places that provide free Wi-Fi access. Detection of fake 
authentication is necessary to maintain communication 
success. Several methods have been applied to detect fake 
authentication such as the use of Wireless Intrusion Detection 
System (WIDS) or certificates on Transport Layer Security 
(TLS). However, attackers can trick the use of WIDS or TLS. 
Moreover, the WIDS and TLS techniques require large costs 
and computations. In this study, a lightweight method based 
on the comparison of BSSID/MAC address for detecting fake 
authentication is proposed. The lightweight method is 
implemented by creating an application that runs on Android 
mobile phones, and Linux operating system. We compared 
the detection performance of the device with the proposed 
application and the one without the proposed application. It 
can be concluded that the proposed method using comparison 
of BSSID / MAC address is an effective way to detect fake 
authentication attacks on Wi-Fi networks. 
Keywords—fake authentication, fruitywifi, karma, Wireless 
Fidelity 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Wireless Fidelity, abbreviated as Wi-Fi, is one way to 
connect computing devices to the wireless network. With 
this wireless connection, Wi-Fi has advantages that cannot 
be provided by cable networks, such as convenience and 
flexibility of use. Not surprisingly, this network connection 
is very popular used in public places (hotels, coffee shops, 
restaurants), as well as private places (residences, offices) 
[9]. However, the convenience of using Wi-Fi also makes 
the emergence of fad or crime to abuse it, for example 
stealing user data or information. Attackers install fake 
Access Point to trap users and then steal user identity 
information. The information obtained can then be used to 
carry out serious attacks, for example carrying out a Man in 
the Middle (MITM) attack to intercept communications that 
occur on computer networks. However, to apply such an 
attack, the attacker must be part of the telecommunications 
system used by the victim [1] [11]. 
In Wi-Fi networks, attackers can become part of the 
telecommunications system by exploiting the weaknesses of 
probe request frames and probe response frames at the stage 
of the Wi-Fi association [2]. The attacker will monitor the 
probe request frame, which is sent automatically by the 
target, and extract the Service Set Identifier (SSID) value. 
The SSID value is then used as a pseudonym for the Access 
Point intended for the victims. To monitor probe requests, 
however, compatible hardware and software are needed. In 
this study, karma [3] which runs on the Debian operating 
system is used to conduct fake Access Point. Other than 
monitoring, karma also functions as a honeypot hotspot to 
attarct the victim's Wi-Fi devices to associate with a device 
that karma runs on. After the victim’s devices is associated, 
the attacker has become part of the telecommunication 
system and can tap all communication from and to the 
victim’s devices. To overcome this problem, as main 
contribution of our work, this research proposed a 
lightweight technique for detecting fake authentication 
based on Basic SSID (BSSID) / MAC address verification. 
This paper is organized according to the general 
structure as follows. Section 1 describes the background that 
stirr the motivation for the research; Section 2 summarizes 
the related studies on Wi-Fi attacks; the proposed method is 
explained in Section 3; Implementation and discussion are 
given in Section 4; and Section 5 concludes the study. 
II. RELATED WORKS 
A fake authentication attack on Wi-Fi aims to intercept 
communications made by two entities. There are several 
previous studies with similar themes, i.e. detection of 
MITM attacks on Wi-Fi. In this section some studies related 
to MITM attacks and the weaknesses of association / 
authentication on Wi-Fi are explained. 
Authors in [4] detected Rouge Access Point (RAP) 
which is a security threat for organizations / institutions if 
its use is not controlled. In addition, RAP can also be an 
entry point for MITM attacks. The detection of RAP is done 
at the edge of the network, which is on the side to the public 
internet point. Detection is done using the packet analyzer 
functionality, tcpdump. By carrying out that analysis, it can 
be distinguished between official WLAN networks and 
unofficial WLAN networks (RAP). Weakness of this 
technique is that the tool is made only for laptop devices, 
not for mobile devices. 
Authors in [5] studied and detected Stealth MITM 
attacks by using the Wireless Intrusion Detection System 
(WIDS). Stealth MITM attacks can occur because the 
attacker can directly modify the reply frame of Address 
Resolution Protocol (ARP). The attacker can then exploit 
the weaknesses on key management of Wi-Fi Protected 
Access version 2 (WPA2). By providing / adding WIDS 
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along with the ARP, any Stealth MITM can be proven 
detected. However, the detection process requires additional 
device that has consequences for the need for additional 
cost. 
Another variant of RAP, which exploits the Wi-Fi 
associaton and authentication is called Evil Twin attack. 
Research in [6] [12] [7] suggests various ways of detecting 
if an evil twin is present. While all three research claim to 
have succeeded in detecting evil twin, each have 
assumptions that limits its use. Author in [6] needs a server 
and assumes that a certain malware application be present 
in the victim before the attack. While the research in [12] 
uses Received Signal Strength Indicator (RSSI) specifically 
for detecting evil twin in a smart home environment. Author 
[7] argues that a fake, software-based access point will 
exhibit substantial difference in action or response if 
compared to a real, hardware based one. The solution 
offered is based on differentiating these exhibitions. 
Unfortunately, author [7] does not provide clear direction on 
implementing the solution. 
The practice of Denial of Service (DoS) attacks are an 
auxillary to Man in The Middle (MiTM) attacks, because it 
can disconnect a subscriber and reconnects it to a RAP. The 
work in [2] proposed a technique to detect DoS attack in the 
wireless link layer. It is concluded that by implementing 
Wireless Link Layer Attacks Detection Algorithm 
(WLLADA), the DoS attack attempt can be detected earlier. 
III. PROPOSED METHOD  
The proposed method is to build a fake authentication 
detection application based on the comparison of BSSID / 
MAC addresses. The application was built following the 
standard methodology according to software development 
lifecycle which consists of needs analysis, design / 
modeling, development, and testing. Detailed explanation 
of these stages is given in the following section. 
A. Need Analysis 
The development of the application consists of functional 
and non-functional requirements. Needs analysis is done by 
analyzing documents/references related to user 
authentication [8]. From the document, identified needs are 
as follows: 
 
 1.  Functional Needs 
• The application can get / capture SSID and BSSID 
value of the Access Point; 
• The application has the ability to generate hash 
values using certain hash function algorithm; 
• The application is able to store the computational 
results of the hash function; 
• The application can make a comparison between 
the SSID and BSSID values that have been stored 
and the SSID and BSSID values obtained / 
captured in real time. 
 2. Non-Functional Needs 
• The application can run on the Android and Linux 
operating systems; 
• The application uses the Python programming 
language desktop applications and Java-based 
Android for mobile-based applications; 
• The application runs when the device is turned on, 
and raises a warning if it detects an attack. 
B. Threat Model 
To further understand the threat that fake authentication has 
on the end users, a threat model as shown in Fig. 1 was used 
to alow the attakcer launch a fake authentication attack. 
According to [10], the attack can happen if a subscriber had 
associated with a Wi-Fi access point, shown as number “1” 
in Figure 1. If the subscriber saves the associated Wi-Fi 
access points to subscriber device and enables the 
“automatic connection” option, then it is vulnerable to fake 
authentication. The fake authentication happens if said 
subscriber goes out of reach of his/her genuine access point, 
and searches (broadcasts Probe Request frames) for 
available Wi-Fi options. The fake access point in noticing 
this Probe Request, will respond masquerading as the 
genuine access point, shown as number “2” in Figure 1. The 
subscriber (now victim) is associated to a fake access point, 
and connects to the internet through it. 
Fig. 1. Threat Model 
C. Design/Model 
The design/model shown in Fig. 2 shows the general work 
process of the proposed application. The detailed 
description of each step of Fig 2. is given as follows: 
1. The device will associate with a Wi-Fi network Access 
Point; 
2. The application acquires the SSID of the Access Point; 
SSID = extract SSID (1) 
3. The application extracts the BSSID of the Access Point; 
BSSID = extract BSSID (2) 
4. The application checks the connection type by looking 
for the SSID in the database. 
a. If the connection has been previously associated (the 
SSID is found in the database), go to step 7. 
if checkSSID(SSID) == 1 (3) 
b. Otherwise, it is a new connection (SSID is not found 
in the database), go to step 5; 
if checkSSID(SSID) == 0 (4) 
5. The application hash the extracted-BSSID using a hash 
function; 
HBSSID = hash(BSSID) (5) 
6. The hashed-BSSID along with the SSID are stored in 
the database, then go to step 10; 
Genuine Access Point1
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Fake Access Point2
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h
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store(SSID) (6) 
store(HBSSID) (7) 
7. The application hash the extracted BSSID and then 
compared it to the hash function value (from the same 
SSID) stored in the database. 
H2BSSID = hash(BSSID) (8) 
if H2BSSID =/= HBSSID then disconnect 
(9) 
if H2BSSID == HBSSID then connect (10) 
a. If the result is not the same, then a fake 
authentication attack is assumed in progress, go to 
step 8. 
b. If the comparison result is the same, go to step 9; 
8. The application will disconnect from the access point 
and give a warning to the user about a fake 
authentication attack; 
9. The application responds that the connection is secure 
and does not interfere with the Wi-Fi connection; 
10. Finish 
 
 
Fig. 2. Flowchart of the proposed method 
IV. IMPLEMENTATION AND TESTING 
A. Implementation 
The proposed application was developed on two 
platforms, desktop and mobile. The implementation of 
desktop application uses the Python programming language 
whereas the mobile application using Java Android. The 
main functions of the application, extract BSSID and 
Compare hashed-BSSID, are implemented in both 
platforms and explained as the following: 
a) Extract BSSID 
For the desktop-based application, extract BSSID is 
implemented by the following source 
 
 
 
 
def getBSSID(): 
 BSSID = subprocess.getoutput\ 
("/sbin/iwconfig wlan0").split\ 
("\n")[1].split()[5][0:]     
 return BSSID 
 
whereas for mobile-based application, it is implemented 
through the following source code 
 
wifiManager = 
(WifiManager)getApplicationContext()/ 
.getSystemService(Context.WIFI_SERVICE)
; 
  connection = 
wifiManager.getConnectionInfo(); 
  tSSID = connection.getSSID(); 
  tBSSID = connection.getBSSID(); 
 
b) Compare hashed-BSSID 
This function is implemented on desktop-based application 
through the following source code 
 
def ceklistBSSID(): 
    hashing2 = hashBSSID() 
     
    if hashing2 in 
open('/home/snake/Desktop/savemac.txt')
.read(): 
        print("BSSID is present") 
        os.system("clear") 
        print("disconnecting") 
        os.system("echo password | sudo 
-S ifdown wlan0") 
        loading() 
        gui.vp_start_gui() 
        main() 
    else: 
        savessid() 
 
whereas for mobile based application, it is implemented 
through the following source code 
 
public void cekBSSID(String BSSID){ 
   Toast.makeText(this,"saat 
ini:\n"+tBSSID,Toast. 
   LENGTH_LONG)  
     .show(); 
     if(BSSID.equals(tBSSID)){  
       
Toast.makeText(this,"SAFE",Toast.LENGTH
_LONG). 
       show(); 
     }else{                        
       
Toast.makeText(this,"MITM",Toast.LENGTH
_LONG) 
       .show(); 
          } 
     } 
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B. Testing 
Application Testing is done using Unit Testing and 
System Testing. Unit testing is carried out on each function 
separately to ensure that the functionality of the function has 
been fulfilled and the test results are summarized in Table I. 
The system testing is done by testing the system as a whole 
and then comparing it with the functional requirements that 
have been previously set and summarized in Table II. The 
results of the two tests indicate that the functions stand 
alone, and the overall system can run as expected. 
TABLE I.  UNIT TESTING 
 
TABLE II.  SYSTEM TESTING 
 
V. FAKE AUTHENTICATION DETECTION TESTING 
A. Testing parameters 
TABLE III.  EXPERIMENT ENVIRONMENT PARAMETERS 
Parameters Values 
Network WLAN 
Victims 2 victims, V1 and V2 
V1 using laptop with Linux OS 
V2 using hand-phone with Android OS 
Attacker Conduct fake authentication 
MAC Addr of V1 5C:93:A2:FE:CF:9B 
MAC Addr of V2 54:DC:1D:60:5A:E2 
MAC addr of 
Attacker 
00:08:CA:58:64:97 
Assumption All two victims have previously 
associated with other Access Point before 
the test 
 
Application testing is carried out with experimental 
environment parameters as summarized in Table III. The 
network used is WLAN. There are two victims, V1 and V2. 
V1 using a laptop with OS Linux with the device's MAC 
Address is 5C: 93: A2: FE: CF: 9B while V2 using a mobile 
with an Android OS with the device's MAC Address is 54: 
DC: 1D: 60: 5A: E2. A fake authentication attack is carried 
out by an attacker. With the MAC Address of the device 00: 
08: CA: 58: 64: 97. At the time of testing, it was assumed 
that the two victims V1 and V2 used a device that had been 
associated with another Access Point 
B. Testing implementation 
Fake authentication attack was conducted by attacker 
through the following steps 
1. Turn on the fruitywifi application; 
2. Activate module [AP], karma, and nginx as shown on 
Figure 3. 
 
Fig. 3. Fruitywifi Setup 
After the configuration setup as on Fig. 3, the fake 
authentication attack ran. For making sure, a list of victims 
associated to the furitywifi appeared on the display as 
shown on Figure 4. 
 
Fig. 4. Fake Authentication Attack 
In the experiment, the victim's laptop and cellphone that 
does not have a BSSID detection application will 
immediately associate with a fake Access Point run by 
fruitywifi. The association can be proven in Fig. 4 and  
Fig. 5 for laptops, and Fig. 6 and Fig. 7 for cellphones. 
 
Fig. 5. Victim’s laptop 
No. Function Name Unit Testing Results 
1. get_net_info( ) Correct  
2. getssid( ) Correct  
3. getBSSID( ) Correct  
4. hashBSSID( ) Correct  
5. savessid( ) Correct  
6. saveBSSID( ) Correct  
7. ceklistBSSID( ) Correct  
8. loading( ) Correct  
9. main( ) Correct  
10. p3keccak.Sha3_512() Correct  
No. Functional Requirements Results 
1. Application can retrieve SSID and BSSID/ MAC Address Fulfilled 
2. 
Skema dapat melakukan komputasi 
fungsi Hash terhadap nilai  BSSID/ 
MAC Address Application can 
process BSSID/ MAC Address 
with a hash function 
Fulfilled 
3. Application can store the results of the hashed BSSID/ MAC Address Fulfilled 
4. 
Application can compare the stored 
hashed BSSID/ MAC Address to a 
real time acquired hashed BSSID/ 
MAC Address 
Fulfilled 
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 In Fig. 4 the MAC address of the victim laptop,  
5C: 93: A2: FE: CF: 9B, is detected in the fruitywifi 
application as one of the associated devices. In Fig. 5 the 
victim laptop does not display anything out of the ordinary, 
even the name of the access point remains the same as the 
one previously associated, namely "Huawei". 
For attacks using mobile phones, the conditions are not 
much different from attacks on laptops. As seen in Fig. 6 the 
victim's cellphone is directly associated and doesn't detect 
anything suspicious when associated with the intended fake 
Access Point. In the fruitywifi application shown in Fig. 7, 
the MAC address of the victim's cellphone is detected as one 
of the associated devices. 
 
Fig. 6. Victim’s cellphone 
 
Fig. 7. Victim’s cellphone detected 
From the proof of the fake authentication attack, it can 
be concluded that the attack was successfully carried out by 
the attacker when the BSSID / MAC address detection 
application was not executed on that device. The next step 
that can be done by the attacker is tapping the 
communication (passive attack), or changing the 
communication that is currently running (active attack). 
Both of these attacks are dangerous and are a serious threat 
to victims. 
Fake authentication attacks will not occur if the victim 
device is able to detect changes in the MAC address of the 
SSID that has been associated. Fig. 8 and Fig. 9 each 
illustrate the results of the implementation of a fake 
authentication application if it is run on the victim's laptop 
and cellphone during a fake authentication attack. Looking 
at the details in Fig. 9 it can be seen that the MAC address 
detected is the attacker's MAC address, but the SSID 
displayed is "STSN-AP42". 
 
Fig. 8. Disconnection and warning on victim’s laptop 
 
Fig. 9. Disconnection and warning on victim’s cellphone 
TABLE IV.  EXPERIMENT SUMMARY 
No. Condition With Application 
Without 
Application 
1 Laptop Wi-Fi associated with new access point 
Connection 
established 
Connection 
established 
2 Laptop Wi-Fi associated with known access point 
Connection 
established 
Connection 
established 
3 
Laptop Wi-Fi associated 
with known SSID in a 
fake authentication attack 
Connection 
Denied 
Connection 
established 
4 
Cellphone Wi-Fi 
associated with new 
access point 
Connection 
established 
Connection 
established 
5 
Cellphone Wi-Fi 
associated with known 
access point 
Connection 
established 
Connection 
established 
6 
Cellphone Wi-Fi 
associated with known 
SSID in a fake 
authentication attack 
Connection 
denied 
Connection 
established 
 
The experiment results are summarized in Table IV. It 
can be seen that the user's device, either laptop or cellphone 
that tried to connect to an SSID in a fake Access Point, will 
immediately disconnect the connection. This happened 
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because the application of the MAC address comparison 
installed on the devices detected a change in the SSID that 
means that the SSID was incompatible with the data stored 
in the database. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
In this research, fake authentication attack has been 
implemented by installing fake Access Point to trap victims' 
devices in the form of laptops and cellphones. Then, to 
detect and prevent these fake authentication attack, a 
lightweight detection method based on comparison of 
BSSID / MAC addresses is proposed and implemented. The 
proposed method was implemented in applications running 
on the Linux and Android operating systems. 
Compared to research done by [5] and [6], our detection 
mechanism does not need the presence of additional 
apparatus to detect a rouge access point. Furthermore, our 
solution can detect MITM attacks in public network, while 
research done in [4] and [12] only applies to certain 
confined networks, that are under the control of the user. 
Based on tests carried out using karma application, the 
fake authentication attacks were successfully carried out 
and the victims’ devices successfully associated to the 
intended fake Access Point. Using the MAC address 
comparison application, whenever the application detects an 
inequality on the MAC address comparison, it will 
automatically disconnect the Wi-Fi connection since it 
assumes it as a fake authentication attack. In addition, the 
application does not interfere with other legitimate 
connections that occur while detecting and disconnecting 
the fake connection. Thus, it can be concluded that the 
application meets the purpose of detecting fake 
authentication attacks on Wi-Fi. 
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